The purpose of this article is to structure the extant knowledge on the determinants of microinsurance demand and to discuss unresolved questions that deserve future research. To achieve this outcome, we review the academic literature on microinsurance demand published between 2000 and early 2013. The review identifies 12 key factors affecting microinsurance demand: price, wealth, risk aversion, non-performance risk, trust and peer effects, religion, financial literacy, informal risk sharing, quality of service, risk exposure, age, and gender. We discuss the evidence of how each of these 12 factors influences demand, both within the microinsurance and the traditional insurance markets. A comparison with traditional markets shows an unexpected (negative) effect of risk aversion on microinsurance demand, with trust perhaps being the intervening factor. Other relevant results include the importance of liquidity (and/or access to credit), informal risk sharing, and peer effects on the decision to buy microinsurance. The influence of trust on insurance take-up and the unanticipated results for risk aversion are fertile areas for future research.
Introduction
Life is risky for the poor in developing countries. Illnesses, natural disasters, unemployment, and accidents affect this segment of the population more severely than others due to their lack of formal insurance and their limited social safety nets. Many rely on informal transfers from friends, families, and relatives; however, such transfers often are deficient compared to what is needed.
2 Microinsurance has come to be seen as an important means of managing risk for the poor, but yet demand for it is relatively low. The intent and contribution of this paper is to organize the extant knowledge on the determinants of microinsurance demand. We undertake a rigorous review of 41 papers that specifically discuss this topic. We identify 12 aspects that have received significant attention in the academic literature. Using Outreville's 4 insurance demand framework, we categorize these 12 characteristics into several important factors: economic factors (price, wealth), social and cultural factors (risk aversion, non-performance risk, trust and peer effects, religion, financial literacy), structural factors (informal risk sharing, quality of service, risk exposure), and personal and demographic factors (age, gender) .
2 See Fafchamps and Lund (2003) . 3 See Cole et al. (2013) ; Giné et al. (2008) ; ; Thornton et al. (2010) . 4 See .
A second contribution of this paper is its comparison of microinsurance markets with traditional insurance markets. Traditional insurance refers to insurance geared toward moderate to high income markets predominantly in developed countries that have an established insurance culture. 5 Several findings emerged from this comparison. First, while the influence of risk aversion in traditional markets is ambiguous, it is almost universally negative in the microinsurance domain. Various studies point to the importance of trust in insurance provider as a major factor in this surprising result, a factor that perhaps explains the ambiguous results in the traditional market. Second, while price is negatively related to takeup in both markets, as expected, the literature suggests that price alone cannot account for the low take-up rates in the microinsurance market. Similarly, while wealth/income are positively related to take-up in both markets, lack of resources (referred to as credit or liquidity constraints) does not fully explain why the microinsurance market is not more robust. Also somewhat surprising is that informal risk-sharing mechanisms can have either a positive 6 or a negative 7 effect on demand for microinsurance. Further study of all these characteristics is likely to improve both the traditional and the microinsurance markets.
This article is organized as follows. In the following section, we first present results from empirical analyses of the determinants of microinsurance demand, focusing on 12 key factors highlighted in the literature. In Section 3 we compare microinsurance and traditional insurance markets and derive future research needs. Conclusions are presented in Section 4. 5 For a more comprehensive distinction between microinsurance and traditional insurance, see Lloyd's (2009) . 6 See Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) . 7 See .
Over the past 10 to 15 years, there has been a tremendous expansion of academic research on microinsurance markets. 12 Indeed, we are now at the point where some of what we are learning in the microinsurance domain, such as the relevance of trust in generating demand, may shed some light on the traditional insurance market as well. Yet numerous unanswered questions remain, especially given the persistently low take-up rate of microinsurance around the globe, even when coverage is subsidized.
With the goal of advancing the field, we review studies on microinsurance demand covering the period from 2000 to early 2013. Our search and identification strategy followed Biener and Eling 13 with the purpose of ensuring that the studies included meet academic standards (the search strategy description is available upon request). This strategy resulted in the identification of 41 papers that specifically analyse demand issues in microinsurance markets.
Based on Outreville's 14 categorization scheme, we identified 12 factors considered key determinants of microinsurance demand, which are listed in Table 1 . Some variables, such as trust and peer effects, financial literacy, informal risk sharing, and quality of service, have not been considered explicitly in traditional markets, and some variables may be categorized differently.
15
12 See Biener and Eling (2012) . 13 See Biener and Eling (2012) . 14 See . We note, however, that Outreville's focus is on cross-national evaluations, which are more focussed on macro factors than on micro factors. , in contrast, considers the literature on life insurance demand within specific markets, focussing on micro factors. We combine the efforts of both authors in constructing our categorization of the literature. 15 For instance, considers age and religion under personal and demographic factors. Our categories are intended to be as consistent as possible with those of . is affected by price, may play a role in trust, which in turn appears to affect take-up. These factors likely are relevant in the traditional insurance market as well, yet may not be as evident, perhaps due to far different socioeconomic conditions for insureds in that market.
Economic factors

Price of insurance (including transactions costs)
Evidence for microinsurance markets: Following standard economic theory, the price of any normal good is expected to be inversely related to demand for that good (or service).
Several studies estimate price sensitivity of microinsurance by randomizing discount vouchers or subsidies. Using just such a method, Cole et al. 17 find significant price sensitivity for rainfall insurance demand in India-specifically, a 10 percent price decline increases the probability of take-up by 10.4-11.6 percent of the baseline take-up rate, indicating a price elasticity of 1.04-1.16. Mobarak and Rosenzweig 18 find that a 50 percent price decline relative to the actuarial price increases the probability of take-up by 17.6 percentage points, suggesting a price elasticity of 0.44, a result strikingly similar to that of Karlan et al. 19 Likewise, Dercon et al. 20 find that reductions in price lead to significant effects on health insurance demand, with 20 percent discount vouchers leading to a 12 percentage point increase in probability of purchase, yielding a price elasticity of 0.6. Gaurav et al. 21 test the effect of a money-back guarantee for a full refund of the insurance premium if the rainfall insurance policy fails to pay out 22 and, surprisingly, find no effect on demand. The findings from the studies on price and microinsurance demand are summarized in Table 2. 17 See Cole et al. (2013) . 18 See Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) . 19 See Karlan et al. (2012) . 20 See Dercon et al. (2012) . 21 See Gaurav et al. (2011) . 22 The ceiling to the refund was one unit of insurance. Thornton et al. 25 identify cost of time and effort as an important reason for choosing not to enrol in health insurance, even when it is subsidized. Allowing workers to sign up directly at their place of employment, rather than miss a day of work due to the process, led to a 30 percentage point higher take-up.
While reducing the price of microinsurance is likely to increase demand, overall take-up rates may remain low. Cole et al. 26 find that even when prices are significantly below actuarially fair prices, fewer than half of households purchase rainfall insurance. Thornton et al. 27 observe that randomized subsidies increase take-up of health insurance, yet only 30 percent of those awarded a six-month subsidy enrol in the plan. Some evidence suggests that lack of demand is associated with lack of experience with insurance. In response, Cole et al. 28 recommend heavy initial subsidies. The influence of subsidies, however, may be perverse.
Thornton et al., 29 Fitzpatrick et al., 30 and Bauchet 31 find that retention rates drop significantly following expiration of subsidies, running counter to the notion that familiarity will improve results. Furthermore, some instances of subsidy use appear to break the informal support mechanisms (often referred to as 'solidarity') that existed before insurance products were introduced, exacerbating the situation.
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24 See De Bock and Gelade (2012) . 25 See Thornton et al. (2010) . 26 See Cole et al. (2013) . 27 See Thornton et al. (2010) . 28 See Cole et al. (2013) . 29 See Thornton et al. (2010) . 30 See Fitzpatrick et al. (2011) . 31 See Bauchet (2013) . 32 See Latortue (2006) .
Regarding transaction costs, several studies posit that microfinance institutions (MFI)
could play a role in lowering such costs. 33 Whether this will be the case appears to depend on ease of access to the MFI location, trust in the MFI, and, sometimes, the ability to bundle credit with insurance purchases. Thornton et al. 34 find a slight negative effect (5.4 percentage points) on enrolment among participants assigned to an MFI rather than to a government agency. Qualitative data gathered through participant surveys suggest that administrative challenges in working with these particular MFIs may increase rather than decrease transaction costs. Other studies indicate that access to agents at work, the availability of periodic rather than lump-sum payments, and similar factors are relevant to demand.
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Comparison with evidence for traditional insurance: As expected, price also affects traditional insurance demand. 36 Evidence from developed markets generally shows a price elasticity of demand for insurance of .2 to .4, 37 which is lower than that observed in microinsurance markets. Moreover, transaction costs are also important barriers to enrolment in traditional markets. Low take-up rates of public health insurance in the United States, for instance, have been associated with burdensome transaction costs.
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Price is a relative factor, however, and we anticipate that there will be significant differences between traditional and microinsurance markets in the matter of price. Although premiums are 'low' in the microinsurance market, even this cost when compared with income and/or available assets may well be high for the target population. Furthermore, the portion of the premium associated with loss costs tends to be lower in microinsurance than in similar 33 See Akotey et al. (2011); Tadesse and Brans (2012) . 34 See Thornton et al. (2010) . 35 See Akter et al. 2008. 36 See Babbel (1985) ; Browne and Kim (1993) ; Mantis and Farmer (1968) ; for a more comprehensive review, see . 37 See Marquis et al. (2004) . 38 See Aizer (2007) ; Baicker et al. (2012) ; Bansak and Raphael (2006) . traditional insurance products, given the effect of fixed costs in setting premiums. To the extent that consumers are aware of these differences, theory would suggest lower demand in the microinsurance market as a result.
Wealth (access to credit/ liquidity) and income
Evidence for microinsurance markets: Several studies show a positive relationship between wealth 39 and microinsurance purchase. The underlying theory is that wealth provides higher levels of liquidity and/or access to credit so that the purchase of insurance is feasible.
Access to credit refers to borrowing opportunities; liquidity refers to availability of assets beyond what is needed to cover basic household expenses. Giné et al. 40 find that take-up rates for rainfall insurance in rural India are higher among wealthier households. Similarly, in a field experiment in India, Cole et al. 41 find that wealthier households are more likely to purchase rainfall insurance. In both instances, less-wealthy households are believed to have little to no margin for insurance purchase after paying for agricultural needs at the start of the growing season (which is also the time when insurance would need to be purchased). These households may want insurance, but simply do not have the resources to buy insurance at the time when premiums are due.
The wealth effect in the microinsurance market, therefore, appears distinct from the effect in traditional markets, where wealth often translates into greater levels of potential loss, leading to more insurance being purchased. In microinsurance markets, wealth is instead a signal of access to credit (and/or liquidity). A priori it is not clear whether the effect of access to credit on demand is positive or negative. On the one hand, households without access to 39 Wealth is measured differently across studies, ranging from total number of livestock and total land owned to creating an index using number of durable goods such as TV, radio, bicycle, etc. 40 See Giné et al. (2008) . 41 See Cole et al. (2013). credit have less ability to smooth consumption in case of a shock and they thus may place higher value on insurance as a means to reduce income volatility. 42 Gollier's 43 theoretical model follows this reasoning. On the other hand, households lacking access to credit may not have funds enough to buy insurance even though a shock may be more damaging to them than to households less constrained. Cole et al. 44 find support for this second line of thought, observing that take-up increases by 140 percent when households are given enough cash to buy one policy. The authors speculate as to the effects on take-up of even higher levels of cash disbursement.
Access to credit/liquidity alone, however, will not necessarily raise microinsurance demand significantly. Clarke 45 shows that even for farmers who are not credit constrained and who are offered actuarially fair premiums, basis risk causes them to purchase less than full insurance. Other scholars, such as Ito and Kono 46 and Karlan et al., 47 find little or no effect of credit constraints on microinsurance demand. The literature dealing with the effect of access to credit/liquidity on microinsurance demand is summarized in Table 3 . To address the problem of credit constraints, Liu and Myers 48 propose an insurance design where farmers can delay payment of the premium until the end of the insured period. Empirical results of such a
design are yet to be assessed.
42 . 43 See Gollier (2003) . 44 See Cole et al. (2013) . 45 See . 46 See Ito and Kono (2010) . 47 See Karlan et al. (2012) . 48 See Liu and Myers (2012) . Income also is expected to affect a household's ability to afford insurance, yet it is especially difficult to measure in societies where wage income is negligible and self-reported measures of income are likely to be unreliable. 49 Studies that measure income's effect on demand find either a positive or no effect. Jutting 50 observes that low income plays a key role in nonparticipation in a community-based health insurance scheme in rural Senegal;
49 See Morris et al. (2000) . 50 See Jutting (2003) ; this study looks at whether insurance makes members better off than non-members. While it does not specifically look at insurance demand, it asks non-members the reason for not taking up insurance.
Fitzpatrick et al. 51 and Thornton et al. 52 find no effect of income on insurance take-up rates.
These results may reflect the high degree of correlation between income and other household characteristics.
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Comparison with evidence for traditional insurance: Research on traditional insurance demand tends to consider wealth and income as proxies for loss potential. That is, the more wealth and/or income, the greater the potential loss and, therefore, the greater the demand for insurance. The opposite could be true, however, assuming decreasing relative risk aversion.
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Under this theory, the greater the wealth, the less the individual will be concerned over any specific potential shock.
Both income and wealth are found to be relevant in traditional insurance markets, and this result is supported by theory. 55 Outreville's 56 review shows that greater levels of national income (and, in a few studies, wealth) are associated with higher insurance penetration rates.
Because of multicollinearity issues, most studies include either income or wealth in the analysis, rather than both simultaneously.
Wealth appears to affect the microinsurance and traditional insurance markets differently, although the expected sign of the effect is positive in both cases. In the traditional market, wealth (and/or income) typically represents potential loss. The larger that potential loss, the higher the level of insurance purchased. As discussed above, an alternative hypothesis associates lower relative risk aversion with increasing wealth, but most empirical 51 See Fitzpatrick et al. (2011) . 52 See Thornton et al. (2010) . 53 See Thornton et al. (2010) . 54 See Mossin (1968) . 55 For a more comprehensive review, see . 56 See .
findings support the loss potential theory. Within microinsurance markets, greater levels of wealth (and/or access to credit markets) provide a means to pay an insurance premium.
Lower-income individuals may actually have a greater need for insurance than the more wealthy because of the relative influence of the same type of shock, but those with lower incomes may suffer resource constraints that make insurance purchase infeasible. Even so, resource constraints do not appear to fully explain the low take-up rates in emerging markets. issue that needs to be addressed when seeking higher microinsurance take-up rates.
Comparison with evidence for traditional insurance: In terms of contractual nonperformance risk, Wakker et al. 77 show that even a small probability that the client will not receive a payout has a negative impact on insurance demand in traditional markets. These results are consistent with evidence suggesting that insurers can extract higher prices by 70 See Doherty and Schlesinger (1990) . 71 See Dercon et al. (2011) . 72 See Dercon et al. (2011) . 73 For instance, a farmer who purchases indexed crop insurance could receive payment even when crops are not damaged and, importantly, might be denied compensation even when crops are lost. Payment is related to some underlying condition, such as the level of rainfall, rather than actual loss experience. 74 See . 75 See Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) . 76 See Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) . 77 See Wakker et al. (1997). demonstrating lower default risk. 78 Moreover, the quality of the legal and regulatory environment has a significant effect on insurance markets in developed countries. law, the implication is a negative impact on insurance demand; 87 however, we are unaware of any work empirically analysing this relationship in the microinsurance context.
One method of building trust is through participatory games that teach players how insurance works. Patt et al. 88 find that this method seemed to build trust when used with a group of farmers. Results from studies testing the effect of trust on microinsurance demand are summarized in Table 4 . that the referral incentive has a negative influence on insurance demand relative to the basic marketing treatment. The authors suggest that the negative impact of peer referrals may be due to distrust of insurance sales staff. Hence, trust in one's peers seems to be an important factor in their influence on demand.
Comparison with evidence for traditional insurance:
There is some, albeit limited, evidence that peer effects are relevant for insurance decisions in the traditional market.
Sorensen finds that there is some effect of co-workers' decisions on one's own decision to purchase health insurance in the United States.
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89 See Morsink and Geurts (2011) . 90 See Karlan et al. (2012) . 91 See Giné et al. (2011) . 92 See Cai et al. (2011) . 93 See Dercon et al. (2012) . 94 See Sorensen (2006) .
Religion/fatalism
Evidence for microinsurance: Religion sometimes is considered to be related to risk attitudes as well as to a sense of cohesion within a community. A related factor, 'fatalism', is a measure of the extent to which individuals view events as outside of their control. 95 See Gheyssens and Gunther (2012) . 96 See Cole et al. (2011) . 97 See Cole et al. (2013) . 98 See Eisenhauer and Halek (1999) . 99 See Bartke and Schwarze (2008) ; Noussair et al. (2012) . 100 See Beck and Webb (2003) ; Browne and Kim (1993); Feyen et al. (2011) . Distinct from financial literacy, education has been posited as a relevant factor in insurance demand. While education has been used as a proxy for financial literacy when no other measure is available, the two are considered different from one another. 110 Empirical evidence suggests that the link between education and microinsurance demand is ambiguous: some find that more educated respondents are more likely to take up insurance; 111 others find no significant association between education and insurance uptake once accounting for financial literacy.
Financial literacy
112
Comparison with evidence for traditional insurance: There is quite an extensive literature on the association between financial literacy and other financial services such as savings, retirement funds, and the like, but studies on its relationship with insurance demand in developed markets is limited. 113 Nevertheless, the existing evidence indicates a positive association between financial literacy and insurance demand. 114 Most of the empirical papers on developed insurance markets show a strong positive association between education and insurance demand; 115 however, some studies find no significant relation 116 and others find a negative effect. 117 There may be various reasons for these results, including differences in rigor across educational systems, confounding effects of education with other factors such as income and wealth, and cultural aspects involving how education influences custom. Further study on both education and literacy is warranted.
Structural factors
Informal risk sharing
Evidence for microinsurance: Informal risk-sharing networks are an important part of coping with risk in developing countries. 118 Furthermore, the level of informal risk-sharing in a social network can have a significant impact on demand for formal risk-sharing mechanisms such as insurance. Jowett 119 finds that individuals living in highly interconnected communities in Vietnam are far less likely to purchase government health insurance. The findings suggest that strong informal networks may crowd out government interventions.
Mobarak and Rosenzweig 120 explore the hypothesis that risk-sharing networks could actually complement index insurance in the presence of basis risk. They find that in communities with strong informal risk-sharing systems, index insurance can be attractive.
When the formal indexed policy makes a payout, the payment appears to become a part of the community's perceived overall resources, and informal mechanisms then likely spread those payouts to the farmers who experienced the largest losses. Essentially, the community undertakes the administrative task of delivering the insurance payment to the individuals who suffered loss.
Comparison with evidence for traditional insurance:
The use of mutuals and cooperatives in the early stages of insurance market development, especially when mutuals were assessable, 121 was similar to today's informal risk-sharing systems in emerging economies. As assessable mutuals are now rare, perhaps social security systems are the closest relative to informal risk-sharing strategies. Social security is a means by which governments are able to provide (and enhance) the sort of intergenerational informal risk sharing previously common in agrarian societies. By providing protection against health, disability, and mortality risks, social security is expected to have a negative impact on demand for life and health insurance. 122 The empirical results are mixed, 123 however, with some studies finding positive 124 results and others finding negative ones.
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120 See Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) . 121 An assessable mutual is one in which the insurer is able to request additional contributions from the policyholders after conclusion of the policy contract period when full loss and cost information is available. 122 See . 123 For an extensive list of studies, see . 124 See Browne and Kim (1993); . 125 See Rejda et al. (1987) ; Lewis (1989) .
The crowding out issue between formal and informal insurance mechanisms is an important one for microinsurance market development. To the extent that well-functioning informal systems exist, caution is warranted in introducing insurance schemes that could be perceived as substitutes. Furthermore, developing a deeper understanding of the factors that foster success and prevent failure of informal systems will make future microinsurance efforts more sustainable. Landmann et al., 126 for instance, observe that formal insurance crowds out solidarity. When secret saving 127 is possible, however, crowding out is less likely because solidarity levels are already low. Greater understanding of the context, therefore, is key for microinsurance success, both as a business and as a way of providing social value.
Quality of service
Evidence for microinsurance: De Allegri et al. 128 suggest that the decision to enrol in community-based health insurance in rural West Africa is closely linked to the quality of the health centre. In Uganda, Basaza et al. 129 find that poor-quality health care is an important reason for people not to join. Dong et al. 130 note that along with health needs and health demands, quality of care is an important factor in insurance drop-out. Jehu-Appiah et al.
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find that health care provider attitudes are important for households in deciding to enrol in the national health insurance scheme in Ghana. Similarly, Nguyen and Knowles 132 find that demand for health insurance in Vietnam increases significantly with the expected benefits of insurance as measured by distance to and quality of a provincial hospital.
126 See Landmann et al. (2012) . 127 In some communities, saving secretly (i.e., without other members of the community observing) may not be possible due to the closeness of the community members. 128 See De Allegri et al. (2006) . 129 See Basaza et al. (2008) . 130 See Dong et al. (2009) . 131 See Jehu-Appiah et al. (2011) . 132 See Nguyen and Knowles (2010) .
Comparison with evidence for traditional insurance:
There is some evidence in the developed markets that quality of care is an important determinant of health insurance takeup. Costa and Garcia 133 find that quality of services (e.g., long waiting lists) explains the low demand for public health care in Spain, which provides universal access to health care. The role of quality in insurance demand (and likely other issues as well, such as adverse selection and moral hazard) is an appropriate topic for future research. 133 See Costa and Garcia (2003) . 134 See Arun et al. (2012) . 135 See Cole et al. (2013) . 136 See Galarza and Carter (2010) . 137 See Johnson et al. (1993) ; Kunreuther (1996) ; Kunreuther and Pauly (2005) . 138 See Browne and Kim (1993) 153 Gandolfi and Miners 154 , however, observe that differences in purchase decisions of men and women depend on women's labour force participation.
Risk exposure
Comparison of microinsurance and traditional insurance and future research
Based on the above discussion of theoretical predictions and empirical findings regarding demand in both microinsurance and traditional insurance markets, we identify important areas for future research. In Table 5 , we summarize what we know so far about the differences between traditional insurance and microinsurance markets. The structure of Table   5 follows that of Outreville 155 and Zietz, 156 who provide a comprehensive overview of variables affecting demand for traditional insurance, including life and property-liability insurance. 159 These are largely based on and , except where noted. 160 An exception is Ito and Kono (2010) , but they test for prospect theory where risk-loving attitude explains low insurance demand. 161 An exception to the positive effect of peers is Dercon et al. (2012) , but they suggest that lack of trust in peers is responsible for the negative impact on demand. As demonstrated in Table 5 , numerous opportunities for future research are evident.
Specifically, studying the influence of trust on insurance take-up, both in the traditional and microinsurance markets, appears warranted. Furthermore, the reasons for limited price and wealth effects appear connected to understanding and confidence in the insurance market.
Cultural and demographic factors appear quite important in insurance demand. Finally, the ambiguous results for risk aversion need more research. Theory suggests that greater risk aversion ought to lead to higher microinsurance demand. Even empirically, the current inverse relationship may be due to seeing insurance as a risky product (trust and nonperformance). Once we control for insurance as a risky product, will we still see an inverse relationship? This is an important research question which must be answered empirically.
Moreover, many variables that have been tested in the traditional insurance markets have yet to be analysed in microinsurance markets. Some of these variables may be relevant only when conducting tests across economies and/or time, such as inflation, interest rates, population density and urbanization, financial development, the legal environment, and enforcement of property rights. Yet these conditions appear to be quite influential within the microinsurance context. For instance, issues of trust have been identified as key factors in microinsurance demand, as noted above. Trust, in turn, is believed affected by the legal environment and enforcement of property rights. Greater appreciation for the influence of all of these factors can be expected to influence policymakers in their efforts to expand microinsurance markets. Cross-national and multi-period analyses, therefore, offer an important avenue for future research.
Based on the theoretical and empirical findings, we present, in Figure 1 , a framework for future research. The 12 prominent variables (rectangles) discussed so far are observable variables, while the factors (ovals) that define these variables are latent, unobservable conditions. In addition to showing the anticipated effect of relevant variables, we also integrate interactions between these variables and how they influence demand. For example, we take contractual non-performance and basis risk to be a variable that affects the relationship between (1) risk aversion and microinsurance demand, as non-performance risk contributes to perceiving insurance as a risky activity, and (2) trust and microinsurance demand, as the higher the non-performance risk, the lower the level of trust in the insurer, shown as arrows connecting non-performance risk to risk aversion and to trust.
Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests complex relationships among the factors themselves. For instance, economic factors (e.g., wealth) may affect social and cultural factors (e.g., risk aversion). Interventions and/or policies aimed at increasing microinsurance demand will need to take these substantive interactions into account. Figure 1 is built as a structural model, which is the basis of structural equation models used in empirical research. 163 An empirical test of this model presents another opportunity for future research. 
Conclusion
The last decade's expansion of academic research on microinsurance reveals some
interesting patterns of what we know and, even more importantly, what we do not know about this increasingly important market. In this paper, we assembled the available research on microinsurance demand with the intent of identifying how the evidence compares and contrasts with evidence and theory for traditional insurance markets. The empirical evidence reveals several factors that are key in explaining the relatively low demand for microinsurance to date: price, wealth, risk aversion, non-performance risk, trust and peer effects, religion, financial literacy, informal risk sharing, quality of service, risk exposure, age, and gender.
Importantly, most of these factors can be influenced by insurers, community leaders, aid agencies, and governments. Also important is recognition of the complex interaction between these factors and the need for far more research. Toward that goal, we present a framework for future research that can be tested empirically.
